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Abstract  
We analyze whether voters value local political representation by exploiting 
municipal mergers, which increase the number of candidates available to voters 
and intensify political competition. In the Finnish open-list proportional 
representation system, voters rank the candidates within parties, and thus, 
concentrating votes to local candidates increases the extent of local 
representation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the vote 
distributions become more concentrated in municipalities less likely to gain local 
representation after the mergers. Moreover, the effect is much larger in 
municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. The 
latter result disentangles voters’ responses from the responses of other political 
actors. The results are important also for designing local government mergers, 
which are an important policy tool in many countries. They highlight that 
concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers have merit, because 
voters have preferences for local representation. At the same time, the vote 
concentration patterns we find alleviate these concerns. 
 
Key words: Electoral boundary reform, difference-in-differences, local 
representation, municipality mergers, strategic voting. 
  
JEL classes: C21, C23, D72, H73, H77. 
  
 
 
1 
 
1.	Introduction	
Received literature in both economics and political science shows that 
representation in a legislative body matters for the geographic distribution of 
centralized spending and the type of public spending in general.1 
Representation should be important also at the local level. If households sort 
into local communities based on their preferences concerning local public 
goods as suggested by Tiebout (1956), a local candidate is likely to share 
voters’ preferences over the service-tax bundle that the local public sector 
offers. In addition, voters’ preferences are likely to be heterogeneous with 
respect to the geographic location of the services. Moreover, local governments 
cater to these heterogeneous preferences from a common pool of funds, which 
implies that voters need a local representative to ensure their own share of the 
spending (Weingast et al. 1981) and to prevent others from spending too much 
(Baron and Ferejohn 1989).  
In this paper, we analyze whether voters value local political 
representation by studying how voters in municipal council elections reacted to 
a recent wave of municipality mergers in Finland.2 Here local representation 
refers to the candidates residing in the voters’ pre-merger municipalities who 
are elected to the post-merger municipal council. Using the terminology coined 
by Duverger (1954), a municipal merger can be seen as an electoral boundary 
reform that results in both mechanical and psychological effects. The 
mechanical effects of a merger result from the way it changes the set of voters 
that are able to vote for a given candidate, the set of candidates competing 
against each other and the number of seats over which they compete. The 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Knight (2005 and 2008), Dragu and Rodden (2011) and Albouy (2013) for evidence 
on the geographic distribution of centralized spending and Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo (2004) concerning spending that benefits minority groups. 
2 A related branch of research is interested in the effects of electoral rules on voting. See e.g. 
Blais et al. (2011) and Fiva and Folke (2014). These papers do not analyze changes in 
geographic electoral boundaries. Furthermore, redistricting and voting has been studied 
previously in national elections (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2000 and Hayes and McKee 2009).  
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mechanical effects are likely to lead to psychological effects, i.e. behavioral 
responses by political actors.  
For our purposes, the essential feature of the Finnish local election system 
is that each voter casts a single vote to a single candidate meaning that voters 
(not parties) decide which candidates are elected from a given list. Therefore, 
votes contain information on voter preferences over individual candidates. 
From the voters’ point of view, the electoral boundary reforms have two major 
components. First, a merger can be seen as an expansion of the voters’ choice 
set, because in the merged municipalities voters can also vote for new non-local 
candidates. If the location of candidates is not relevant to voters, at least some 
voters should find a better match from the new larger set of alternatives. If so, 
the vote distribution of a municipality (when measured at the pre-merger level) 
should be less concentrated after a merger as votes are scattered to a larger 
number of candidates. If, however, voters prefer local over non-local 
candidates, they should keep on voting them regardless of the new choices 
available. This, in turn, should result either in no change or in a more 
concentrated vote distribution depending on the number of local candidates in 
the post-merger elections. According to a standard revealed preference 
argument, if we observe a voter choosing a local candidate over a non-local 
candidate when both are available, this choice reveals a preference for local 
over non-local candidates. 
Second, by increasing political competition, a merger profoundly affects 
the extent of local representation, i.e. the expected number of representatives 
from voters’ pre-merger municipalities in the post-merger municipal council. If 
voters value local representation and act strategically, i.e. take into account 
election probabilities, voters should concentrate votes to those local candidates 
that have a genuine chance of winning a seat from a non-local candidate. This 
means that vote concentration should increase with the strategic incentives.  
The boundary reforms naturally facilitate a difference-in-differences 
(DID) analysis where the unit of observation is the pre-merger municipality and 
3 
 
voting data come from elections before (2004 elections) and after (2008 
elections) the merger wave. The key aspect of our analysis is that we can 
decompose a merged municipality into the original pre-merger municipalities 
and trace back the vote distributions of individual candidates at the pre-merger 
municipal level both before and after the mergers. Furthermore, using the pre-
reform vote distributions and the post-merger municipalities as new electoral 
districts, we can calculate counterfactual election outcomes that measure the 
mechanical effects of the mergers on local representation, i.e. the expected 
electoral success of local candidates. Our interest lies on the voters’ 
psychological response to these mechanical effects.  
We find that the vote distributions of the merged municipalities are 
clearly more concentrated in the post-merger elections than before, whereas 
there is no change among the municipalities that did not merge. More 
importantly, however, the concentration effect is clearly larger in municipalities 
with higher treatment intensity.3 In fact, we find no vote concentration among 
the merged municipalities that did not expect to lose representation (typically 
large municipalities merging with smaller partners), but find substantial vote 
concentration among municipalities that did expect a substantial loss (typically 
small municipalities merging with larger partners). This happened despite the 
fact that the voters in these municipalities had a much larger set of candidates 
and parties to choose from after a merger. We report the same patterns in 
overall vote distributions and the vote distributions over local candidates. 
We also analyze whether the voters’ response is larger in municipalities 
where the benefits of gaining local representation are larger. For example, 
losing local services, such as day care centers or schools, has more negative 
consequences in the localities farther away from the new location of these 
services (typically the new municipal center) due to increase in travel costs. Our 
                                                 
3 The mergers were decided voluntarily at the local level and are a non-randomly selected 
sample both from the perspective of the merger decision and the intensity of the treatment. 
Reassuringly, our DID design is valid in the light of common pre-trend tests (both the merger 
decision and merger subgroups with different treatment intensity), alternative control group 
(municipalities that considered merging, but eventually did not) and controlling for observables. 
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main finding in this respect is that the effect of our treatment on vote 
concentration increases substantially both as the geographic distance of voters’ 
to the center of the new municipality (the largest municipality in a merger) and 
income heterogeneity between merging municipalities increase. The first result 
suggests that voters care about the geographic location of public services, and 
the second, that there is between municipality preference heterogeneity over 
services in accordance with Tiebout (1956) sorting. Overall, our findings show 
that voters value local representation so that the geographic location is an 
important attribute of a candidate. Our findings are also consistent with 
strategic voting in order to increase local representation. 
The question remains whether we can attribute the changes in vote 
distributions to voter behavior instead the behavior of other political actors. 
Overall, the reform had a large effect on the set of available candidates both in 
terms of quantity and quality. However, we show that these party and candidate 
responses are not related to the preference heterogeneity measures that are 
important to voters. This observation is crucial and allows us to disentangle 
voters’ behavioral responses from the confounding responses of other political 
actors. We also discuss at length why alternative explanations, such as 
campaigning, changes in voter preferences, voters rewarding for merger 
decisions or information advantages of local candidates, are unlikely to explain 
our findings.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that voters were quite successful in their 
efforts. In our data, 20 out of the 120 merged municipalities would not have 
gained any representation into the post-merger council in our counterfactual 
elections. In reality, these municipalities gained on average almost three 
representatives (maximum of 7) and only one of these municipalities failed to 
gain a single one.  
Our findings show that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due 
to mergers are important because of preferences for local representation, but the 
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vote concentration we report alleviates these concerns.4 This result is of 
substantial interest since municipal mergers have been an important policy tool 
in many countries. Major merger reforms have been implemented over time in a 
number of countries including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, 
Sweden and Switzerland (Dafflon 2012; Blom-Hansen et al. 2014; Hinnerich 
2009; Reingewertz 2012; Weese 2015). However, the political effects of these 
reforms have been largely neglected in the prior literature. These arguments 
apply also to mergers of other local jurisdictions, such as school districts 
(Gordon and Knight 2009). 
Our results fill a clear gap in the literature, because, to our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to offer evidence concerning voter preferences for local 
representation using actual voting data from a natural experiment.5 We also 
contribute to the small, but growing literature that tests strategic voting using 
natural experiments by analyzing voter behavior in a novel context.6  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
briefly describe the institutional framework. In Section 3, we describe the 
boundary reforms in more detail. We present our econometric approach in 
Section 4 and the results in Section 5. The first part of Section 5 describes how 
the voters’ choice set changes due to the boundary reforms and the second part 
analyzes voters’ behavior. Section 6 concludes.   
                                                 
4 For a more detailed discussion on jurisdiction size and democracy, see Verba and Nie (1972), 
Dahl and Tufte (1973), Treisman (2011) and Lassen and Serritzlew (2011). 
5 Prior research typically resorts to surveys when measuring voter preferences, which brings 
about its own complications on the appropriate survey design (see e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 
2008), and issues that survey results are often highly responsive to seemingly trivial changes in 
the questionnaire or survey timing (Zaller and Feldman 1992). Shugart et al. (2005) offer 
complementary, but indirect evidence that voters use candidate’s locality as an informational 
cue, whereas Nemoto and Shugart (2013) use evidence from a natural experiment to study how 
localism affects parties’ strategic choices in candidate placement.  
6 A substantial literature studies the extent of strategic voting using survey data (e.g. Blais et al. 
2001; Blais et al. 2005; Abramson et al. 2010). However, the results vary depending on the 
survey design (Alvarez and Nagler 2000). Studies using actual election data usually report 
substantial strategic voting (e.g. Cox 1997; Fujiwara 2011; Lago 2012; Kawai and Watanabe 
2013; Spenkuch 2014). 
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2.	Institutional	background	
In Finland, public goods and services are provided by two tiers of government 
where municipalities constitute the local level. Municipalities are of 
considerable importance to the whole economy as they employ around 20 
percent of the total workforce. The bulk of municipalities’ expenditures come 
from producing social and health care services and primary education. In most 
of these services, the geographic location of services is relevant for the citizens. 
The most important revenue source is the flat municipal income tax which the 
municipalities can set freely. A central government grant system, consisting of 
20 percent of total revenue, is used to equalize local cost and revenue 
disparities.  
Mergers between municipalities are voluntarily. If a proposed merger 
gains a majority in all the participating councils, the merger goes through and if 
not, the municipalities continue as they were. We analyze municipal elections 
before and after the mergers that took place between the 2004 and 2008 
municipal elections. Between these two elections, there were 47 municipal 
mergers involving 130 municipalities. The number of municipalities in a given 
merger ranged from 2 to 10 municipalities. Between these elections, the number 
of municipalities diminished from 432 to 348. 
Our focus is not on the reasons behind this recent merger wave. In public 
discussion, the merger wave is often seen as a result of increasing fiscal 
pressure due to differences in population trends and aging across municipalities 
making it difficult for small and poor municipalities to cope with their 
responsibilities. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) describe the determinants of 
these mergers and find evidence suggesting that fiscal pressure, voter 
preferences and local democracy considerations influence the merger decisions. 
Hyytinen et al. (2014) study these decisions at the individual councilor level 
and find that councilors’ re-election concerns play a role.  
Municipal councils are the main seat of power in the Finnish municipal 
decision making. Finland has a proportional representation (PR) system with 
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eight parties that dominate national and municipal politics. In the 2004 
municipal elections, the three largest parties (the Centre Party, the Social 
Democrats and the National Coalition) received roughly 68 percent of the votes 
with roughly similar shares. All municipalities have the elections on the fourth 
Sunday of October. The council term lasts for four years starting from January 
after the elections. Only permanent residents of a municipality can vote or run 
for a council seat. Each municipality has only one electoral district (i.e. 
constituency) and no geographic quotas are in place, even after a merger. 
The municipal elections use an open-list method. The crucial feature for 
our analysis is that each voter casts a single vote to a single individual 
candidate. Importantly, voters cannot vote for a party without specifying a 
candidate. Council seats are allocated to parties based on the party vote shares 
in accordance with competitive indices set by the d’Hondt method. Thus, voters 
determine the position of the candidates within the party list, whereas parties 
are allocated seats according to the sum of votes over the individual candidates. 
The lists are presented to voters in alphabetical order so the parties cannot 
signal their preferred order using the list. Or course, parties may act as 
gatekeepers in deciding who gets to run.  
In systems with closed lists, analysis of voter preferences over individual 
candidates would not be possible because the parties determine the list 
rankings. In this case, however, the analysis of strategic party responses would 
still be possible (see e.g. Galasso and Nannicini 2015). Thus, electoral 
boundary reforms together with open list elections offer a unique opportunity to 
study voter preferences over individual candidates. 
3.	Mergers	as	electoral	boundary	reforms	
Mergers like all electoral reforms bring about both mechanical and 
psychological effects. Since our focus is on local representation, the mechanical 
effect of interest refers to the way the reform changes the extent of 
representation from the perspective of the pre-merger municipalities. These 
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mechanical effects arise because the reform changes mechanically the set of 
voters that are able to vote for given candidates, the set of candidates that 
compete over council seats and the number of available council seats (relative 
to number of voters). The way a given merger changes the latter two 
components is driven by electoral rules governing the council size and the 
maximum number of candidates that parties are allowed to nominate. In 
Finland, the municipal council size is an increasing but concave step function of 
municipality’s population, whereas the maximum number of candidates per 
party or list size is 1.5 times the council size.7 Typically the constraint on the 
list size is binding only in the larger municipalities. 
Our main interest lies on the psychological effects, i.e. how different 
political actors respond to these mechanical effects. We concentrate on voter 
behavior, but at the same time we need to carefully consider the role that 
candidates and parties, as the supply side of politics, play in shaping the voters’ 
new choice set. After a merger is decided, candidates and parties make their 
decisions concerning the composition of party lists and campaigning by taking 
into account the mechanical effects. These responses together with the 
mechanical effects determine the new choice set that voters face in the 2008 
elections.  
From the point of view of voters and local representation, the most 
important mechanical effects are related to the probability of electing a local 
candidate or the expected number of elected local candidates and changes in the 
set of candidates to choose from. We can construct a measure of the mechanical 
effects of interest by calculating counterfactual election outcomes for each 
individual candidate using actual votes and candidates from the 2004 elections, 
                                                 
7 The council size is determined as follows: 13, 15 or 17 seats for a municipal population of 
2000 or less, 21 for 2,001–4,000; 27 for 4,001–8,000; 35 for 8,001–15,000; 43 for 15,001–
30,000; 51 for 30,001–60,000; 59 for 60,001–120,000; 67 for 120,001–250,000; 75 for 
250,001–400,000 and 85 for over 400,000. As an example, consider two municipalities with 
populations of 3,000 and 25,000, respectively. Before the merger, the council sizes of these 
municipalities are 21 and 43. After the merger, the council size will be 43. 
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but assuming that the mergers had taken place.8 Using these counterfactual 
election outcomes, we can calculate the share of the 2004 pre-merger 
candidates that would make it into the new post-merger council with their 2004 
votes. This share is measured at the 2004 pre-merger municipality level.9 
Formally, our treatment variable for municipality i that participates in merger j 
(i.e. the new municipality) is 
 
(1)     1 ,
   ij
councilors from i in council jSeatloss
council size in j
    
 
where the new council size in merger j is dictated by the council size rule and 
the population of the new merged municipality. This measure equals 0 if 
municipality i would get all the council seats in the post-merger council 
(effectively no treatment) and it equals one if it gets none of the seats 
(maximum treatment intensity). The variable is equal to zero also for the 
municipalities that did not merge.  
Due to the election system, the Seatloss measure mainly captures 
situations where the benefit of vote concentration is getting local candidates 
past the non-local candidates in within party rankings. However, within party 
concentration does not increase local representation if parties have very 
different support bases in different municipalities within a merger. Fortunately, 
the three largest parties have significant support base in almost all the 
municipalities making this concern irrelevant in practice (see Figure A1 in the 
Appendix).  
                                                 
8 Hyytinen et al. (2014) do similar calculations, but introduce candidate level uncertainty using 
a bootstrap procedure. Fiva and Folke (2014) also calculate counterfactual elections when they 
study the effects of a reform in election rules. 
9 We believe that this is a salient measure from the voters’ perspective. For example, Hyytinen 
et al. (2014) report a number of instances where local newspapers ran similar counterfactual 
elections before the first elections after a merger and reported what the new council 
composition would be. Also prior evidence from political science literature (e.g. Lago 2008) 
suggests that, in PR systems, voters use past election outcomes when forming expectations over 
future elections. 
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4.	Econometric	analysis		
4.1.	Data	
Our main data source is the election database maintained by the Ministry of 
Justice. These data include information on votes received by individual 
candidates from two municipal elections held in October of 2004 and 2008.10 
We have augmented the data with a rich set of candidate characteristics, 
including their addresses. These data were obtained from The Local 
Government Pensions Institution (KEVA), Statistics Finland, The Finnish Tax 
Authority and The Population Register Centre. In addition to election data, we 
use municipal characteristic to study whether voters’ reactions are 
heterogeneous with respect to differences among merging municipalities. These 
data were obtained from Statistics Finland.11  
The 2008 municipal elections were held using the new merged 
municipalities as constituencies.12 Municipalities are divided into polling 
districts, which simply define the location where people go to vote. The election 
data is registered and publicly available at the polling district and candidate 
level (also votes given in advance are registered to the correct polling districts). 
Since these polling districts do not change because of the mergers, we know the 
location of voters also after the mergers and can build a balanced panel data set 
where the cross-sectional units are the municipalities in 2004, i.e. before the 
mergers.13  
4.2.	Descriptive	statistics	
We start the empirical analysis by reporting descriptive statistics on the Seatloss 
measure and trends in the pre-merger municipal level vote distributions. In 
                                                 
10 We also use data from the 1996 and 2000 municipal elections to evaluate pre-treatment 
trends. 
11 Descriptive statistics for municipality characteristics are reported in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
12 In most cases, the municipalities merged officially at the start of the calendar year 2009. 
However, also in these cases the new municipality division was used in the 2008 elections.  
13 In some cases, the polling districts changed and we were unable to trace back the old 
municipal division. In these rare cases, we drop the entire merger from the analysis.  
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Table 1, we have divided the merger group into three equal-sized subgroups 
based on the (ordered) Seatloss variable. The grouping depicts the incentives 
that voters have for vote concentration. The weak incentives group includes 
municipalities who can expect to do relatively well in the next elections in 
terms of local representation (low values of Seatloss) while the strong incentive 
group can expect to do poorly (high values of Seatloss).  
The mechanical effects of the reform in terms of local representation are 
substantial. The municipalities in the weak incentives group would get, on 
average, about 80 percent of the council seats while this share is less than 2 
percent for the municipalities in the strong incentives group. In fact, half of the 
40 municipalities in the strong incentives group would gain no representatives 
into the post-merger council, if the candidates and voters behaved exactly as 
they did in the pre-merger elections. From Table 1, we also see that the 
municipalities in the strong incentives group are small and part of relatively 
large mergers, both in terms of overall merger population and the number of 
participating municipalities. Table 1 also includes a large number of 
municipality characteristics that will be used in robustness checks. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, 2004.  
  Merger = 0 Weak Medium Strong 
  Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Number of observations 287 40 39 41 
Main outcomes:                 
Maximum vote share 0.061 0.022 0.049 0.018 0.065 0.027 0.074 0.025 
Herfindahl index 0.025 0.011 0.016 0.007 0.029 0.014 0.038 0.017 
Merger characteristics:                 
Merger population     29,787 28,973 29,746 30,961 44,052 28,832 
Number of municipalities 1.00 0.00 2.79 1.52 3.64 2.24 4.75 2.56 
Municipality characteristics:                 
Seatloss 0 0 0.194 0.153 0.770 0.117 0.981 0.022 
Municipal population 12,865 40,225 23,327 25,389 6,653 7,637 2,471 1,993 
Debt stock (€ per capita) 1,183 750 1,117 720 1,282 1,083 967 799 
Cash reserves (€ per capita) 504 587 377 438 394 546 535 588 
Operating margin (€ per capita) -3,574 416 -3,412 323 -3,562 412 -3,538 404 
Municipal tax rate (%) 18.60 0.57 18.33 0.71 18.51 0.59 18.45 0.66 
Investment expenses (€ capita) 450 359 445 201 360 211 411 386 
Taxable income (€ per capita) 9,932 2,059 11,323 1,565 10,263 1,617 9,430 1,269 
Corporate income tax base (€1000) 135 87.5 175 218 138 90.3 114 69.1 
Council characteristics:                 
Share of incumbents 0.26 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.27 0.09 0.33 0.12 
Share with a university degree 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05 
Mean income 22,271 4,047 24,529 2,755 22,258 3,119 21,101 2,635 
Mean age 46.85 2.08 46.92 1.52 45.80 2.08 46.00 2.23 
Share of females 0.39 0.05 0.39 0.04 0.40 0.06 0.39 0.07 
Share of municipal employees 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.08 
Notes: Weak, Medium and Strong refer to three equal-sized subgroups based on the (ordered) 
Seatloss variable.  
 
Because our main interest lies on whether voters concentrate their votes to 
local candidates in response to the reform, we first describe graphically how the 
vote distributions evolve over time in the different groups explained above. To 
this end, we use two outcomes to measure the concentration of votes at the pre-
merger municipal level. The first measure is simply the vote share of the most 
popular candidate in the municipality (maximum vote share). Especially in the 
strong incentives groups, these measures are directly related to the vote shares 
of the marginal local candidate(s) at the election threshold. For example, in a 
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municipality that expects to lose all the seats (Seatloss = 1), the most popular 
candidate is also likely to be the marginal local candidate. The second measure 
is the Herfindahl index, which accounts for the situations where more than one 
local candidate is marginal.14  
Figure 1 illustrates these trends for the four municipality groups, where 
the dots represent group specific means in a given election year. Figure 1 can be 
seen as a graphical simplification of the econometric DID analysis reported 
later on where we can fully exploit the continuity of the Seatloss measure. The 
Finnish mergers were decided voluntarily, which raises issues of non-random 
selection that may bias our results. Such selection may relate both to the 
decision to merge and to the treatment intensity. However, both outcomes have 
common trends across the different groups in the pre-treatment period (1996–
2004 elections) when no mergers took place.15 This finding supports the most 
important identification assumption in DID, which is that the outcomes would 
follow the same time trend in the absence of treatment.16 
After the mergers, there is no change in vote concentration in the weak 
incentive group while we see a dramatic concentration in the strong incentive 
group. The change in the medium incentives group is also substantial. This is 
our first piece of evidence that the vote distributions change considerably when 
municipalities undergo a merger and that the change depends on the incentives 
that voters have for vote concentration measured by Seatloss. The results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that voters value local representation and take 
into account the expected extent of local representation in the post-merger 
council. However, voters are not the only political actors that may respond 
                                                 
14 The Herfindahl index is defined as 2
1
,  1,..., ,N iiHI s i N   where si is the vote share of 
candidate i in a particular municipality and N is the total number of candidates in the 
municipality.  
15 There were 6 mergers between 2000 and 2004 which are excluded from the analysis. The 
results are robust to including them. 
16 In Figure A2 in the Appendix, we repeat this analysis using an alternative control group 
consisting of municipalities that did not merge, but voted for a merger between the 2004 and 
2008 elections. The pre-treatment trend is very similar and there is no significant jump in the 
measures of the alternative control group. 
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strategically to the mechanical effects of the reform. This is why, in the next 
section, we analyze the role of each political actor in more detail.   
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in vote distributions in municipality groups, 1996–2008. 
 
4.3.	Econometric	models	
To analyze how different political actors respond to the mechanical effects of 
the reform, we study a variety of outcomes in a continuous treatment DID 
framework. Our first model specification can be written as 
 
(2) 0 1 2 3
1 2 ,
it i t i t
i i t it
y Merger After Merger After
Seatloss Seatloss After u
   
 
    
     
 
where yit is the outcome in question for municipality i (2004 municipal 
division) in year t, Merger a dummy variable that equals one if the municipality 
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underwent a merger between the two elections, After a dummy variable that 
equals one if the data come from post-merger elections,  Seatloss is the variable 
described above and u is the error term. The basic idea behind this specification 
is that, although Seatloss is the main treatment of interest, controlling for 
merging may be important because it may have a direct influence on the 
political scene in a municipality and it is of course correlated with Seatloss.17  
In Eq. (2), the treatment effect  is assumed to be constant. However, in the 
context of local elections the effect is likely to be heterogeneous with respect to 
voter preferences. To allow for heterogeneity, we can add interaction terms to 
Eq. (2): 
 
(3) 
0 1 2 3
1 2
3 4 ,
it i t i t
i i i
i t i i t it
y Merger After Merger After
Seatloss Heterogeneity Seatloss
Seatloss After Heterogeneity Seatloss After v
   
 
 
    
  
     
 
 
where the Heterogeneity measure depends on model specification.18 
We measure preference heterogeneity using five variables. First, if 
councilors and voters consume services in the same location, a councilor living 
close to a voter is likely to share the voter’s preferences over the geographic 
location of public services (elementary schools, health care facilities etc.).19 It is 
plausible to assume that after a merger there is pressure to concentrate at least 
some services to the business center of the largest municipality of a merger. 
Thus, the farther away the voters are from the business center of the largest 
                                                 
17 For example, an increase in jurisdiction size may have a direct effect on voters’ behavior as 
suggested by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011). Alternatively, we can run these regressions using 
only the municipalities that merged. The results are largely the same with these approaches (not 
reported for brevity, but available from authors).  
18 The underlying assumption in this specification is that preference heterogeneity only plays a 
role when there are strategic incentives for vote concentration. This assumption is not driving 
the results, because the results are robust to fully saturating the model with all the baselines and 
the interactions concerning the heterogeneity measures (i.e. Heterogeneity and 
Heterogeneity*After).  
19 House values are tied to the quality of public services in the neighborhood and may be an 
incentive device that also aligns councilors’ and voters’ preferences (DiPasquale and Glaeser 
1999). 
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municipality in the merger the stronger incentives they should have to 
concentrate votes and increase local representation. To measure these 
incentives, we calculated for each merged municipality the median Euclidian 
distance of all eligible voters to the business centers of their own pre-merger 
municipality and the largest municipality in their merger.20 Our Distance 
measure is the difference of these median distances. It is equal to zero for the 
largest municipalities in each merger and for the municipalities that did not 
merge. Note also, that this measure can be negative in some rare cases, 
depending on the location of voters and the new municipality center.21 
Second, in the case of Tiebout-sorting a councilor living close to a voter 
is more likely to share the preferences of the voter in terms of the service-tax 
bundle provided by the municipality. The more between municipality 
heterogeneity there is the more valuable is local representation.  
Our first proxy for sorting based preference heterogeneity is simply an 
indicator whether a municipality and the largest municipality in the merger had 
a different largest party in the 2004 elected councils. We also use two policy 
variables, namely the difference in pre-merger tax rates and per capita 
municipal expenditures. Our final proxy is the difference in the municipal level 
mean of taxable income.22 The last three heterogeneity proxies are calculated as 
follows. For municipality i in merger j we define 
 
(4) 
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_
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20 This calculation is based on the GIS Grid Database (250 m * 250 m grids) of Statistics 
Finland. In addition to coordinates, the data include information on the number of eligible 
voters (population above the age of 18) in each grid. This information together with coordinates 
of municipal centers enables us to calculate the median distance for eligible voters to the 
municipality centers. 
21 This is possible, for example, if the bulk of the population lives close to a municipal border 
and the business center of the neighboring large municipality is also close to this border. 
22 We do not use measures of ethnic, religious or racial heterogeneity, because neighboring 
municipalities are almost identical in these respects. 
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where ,  j jt exp  and jinc  refer to the population weighted means of municipal 
income tax rate, per capita expenditures and taxable income in merger j, 
respectively. Thus, these heterogeneity variables measure the difference 
between the pre-merger municipality and the consequent merger.  
All of these measures are calculated using 2006 data. Of course, these 
measures are highly correlated so we include each heterogeneity measure 
separately in order to mitigate multicollinearity problems. Descriptive statistics 
of our heterogeneity measures are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
To fix ideas on how to interpret Eq. (3), we illustrate the role of 
heterogeneity measures with an example. Figure 2 depicts a map of a real 
merger that involved 10 municipalities. We focus on four municipalities which 
we denote simply as A, B, C and D. A is the largest municipality with a 
Seatloss of 0.40, so it stands to gain the majority in the merged municipality 
council. Municipalities B, C and D are all very small compared to the entire 
merger and Seatloss equals 1 for all of them.  
The voters (or the median voter) in municipalities B and C live roughly 
equally far away from the center of municipality A with Distance measures of 
15.0 and 18.3 km, respectively. Municipality D is much farther away from A 
with a Distance measure of 30.5 km. Our hypothesis is that the voters in D 
would concentrate their votes more than voters in the other municipalities.  
This is indeed the case. The change in the maximum vote share between 
2004 and 2008 is 0.003 for municipality A, 0.079 for B, 0.092 for municipality 
C and 0.287 for municipality D. In the next section, we show that these vote 
concentration patterns hold in the entire data and that the preference 
heterogeneity measures also play a crucial role in ruling out confounding 
explanations to voter responses. 
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are possible because we observe the address of each candidate and can allocate 
them, along with the vote data, to the pre-merger municipalities.  
Table 2 presents the results for the number of candidates and parties 
based on the DID specification in Eq. (2). The results are as expected. From 
columns [1] and [3], we see that due to merging the overall choice set expands 
for voters in municipalities with high values of Seatloss. That is, the voters 
from relatively small merging municipalities have a higher number of 
candidates and parties to choose from in the post-merger elections than before. 
To clarify the interpretation of the results, we consider an example of two 
municipalities. Consider first a municipality with a Seatloss of 0.8. Our model 
predicts that this municipality had (roughly) 72 candidates (95 + 103 – 0.8*157) 
before the merger. After the merger, the prediction is (roughly) equal to 265 (72 
+ 2.3 + 1.4 + 0.8*236). For a municipality with a Seatloss of 0.2, these numbers 
are 166 and 217, respectively. Thus, the DID estimate for a treatment intensity 
of 0.6 is equal to (265–72) – (217–166) = 142, or 0.6*236.   
These changes arise mainly because candidates and parties from the 
larger merger partners become available to these voters. At the same time, the 
number of local candidates goes down in these municipalities (column [2]), and 
the number of local parties increases slightly (column [4]). The fact that the 
number of local candidates decreases can be due to binding party list size, to 
parties’ strategy in nominating candidates or to potential candidates themselves 
opting not to run. The small increase in the number of local parties may be due 
to new candidates that run for the parties that were previously available only in 
the merger partner. Notice that most of the coefficients are the same in columns 
[1] and [2] and in columns [3] and [4], because all candidates and parties are 
local in the 2004 elections (before the mergers) and also in 2008, unless the 
municipality has undergone a merger. 
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Table 2. Effects on the number of candidates and parties. 
  
Number of  
candidates 
Number of 
local 
candidates 
Number of   
parties 
Number of 
local parties 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 95.08*** 95.08*** 5.794*** 5.794*** 
  [5.365] [5.365] [0.117] [0.117]    
Merger 102.8*** 102.8*** 1.852*** 1.852*** 
  [19.26] [19.26] [0.329] [0.329]    
Seatloss -157.3*** -157.3*** -3.443*** -3.443*** 
  [19.177] [19.177] [0.394] [0.394]    
After 2.314*** 2.314*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 
  [0.855] [0.855] [0.069] [0.069]    
Merger*After 1.394 -4.051 -0.105 0.269 
  [10.291] [5.417] [0.210] [0.195]    
Seatloss*After 236.1*** -24.78*** 3.431*** 0.624**  
  [36.60] [5.754] [0.325] [0.293]    
R2 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.12 
N  814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 repeats the analyses of Table 2, but now we allow for treatment 
effect heterogeneity. Table 3 reports only the two coefficients of interest from 
the model specified in Eq. (3), i.e. Seatloss*After (γ3) and 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity*After (γ4). The results from Table 3 are consistent with 
Table 2 and indicate that changes in the voters’ choice set depend on Seatloss, 
but importantly, the availability of local candidates and parties does not depend 
on any of the heterogeneity measures.  
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Table 3. Heterogeneous effects on the number of candidates and parties. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A:  Number of  candidates [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After 258.8*** 166.1*** 217.8*** 247.2*** 171.8*** 
  [69.91] [24.30] [41.23] [41.64] [55.60]   
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.957 117.4*** 43.38 -20.76 30.08**  
After [2.022] [41.29] [46.98] [41.98] [14.25]   
Panel B:  Number of  local 
candidates [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After -32.04** -23.49*** -22.75*** -27.85*** -26.80** 
  [15.26] [5.652] [5.449] [9.238] [11.52]   
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.306 -2.173 -4.848 5.730 0.945 
After [0.520] [5.160] [11.97] [9.746] [3.846]   
Panel C: Number of parties [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After 2.465*** 3.471*** 3.111*** 3.031*** 2.843*** 
  [0.707] [0.413] [0.358] [0.437] [0.444]   
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.041 -0.069 0.761 0.746 0.275*   
After [0.026] [0.435] [0.755] [0.699] [0.157]   
Panel D: Number of local parties [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
Seatloss*After 0.372 0.710** 0.607 0.421 0.51 
  [0.642] [0.346] [0.396] [0.434] [0.518] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.011 -0.145 0.040 0.378 0.053 
After [0.020] [0.363] [0.734] [0.490] [0.158] 
N  814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Next we turn to candidate quality. In Table 4, we present results for three 
quality measures: the share of incumbents, the share of candidates with a 
university degree and mean income of the candidates.23 Again we look 
separately at the changes in overall candidate quality and local candidate 
quality. As before, the results related to all candidates arise mainly from mixing 
the candidate sets of the merging municipalities. The overall candidate quality 
                                                 
23 According to Eggers et al. (2015) incumbency status is by far the most important candidate 
quality measure. However, the richness of our data allows us to use a number of additional 
measures.  
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increases based on education and income (columns [3] and [5]). The negative 
coefficient for Seatloss*After in column [1] reflects the lower share of 
incumbents in larger municipalities due to larger number of candidates relative 
to council seats. Of course in terms of numbers, voters from small 
municipalities have more incumbents to choose from after a merger. Table 4 
also reveals that after the merger, local candidates are, on average, of higher 
quality in the merging municipalities compared to pre-merger elections. The 
shares of incumbents and candidates with a university degree increase among 
local candidates as does their mean income.  
 
Table 4. Effects on candidate quality. 
  Incumbents University degree Income 
  All Local All Local All Local 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 22,271*** 22,271*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [239.5] [239.5] 
Merger -0.079*** -0.079*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 2900*** 2900*** 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [597.4] [597.4] 
Seatloss 0.137*** 0.137*** -0.097*** -0.097*** -3923*** -3923*** 
  [0.024] [0.024] [0.014] [0.014] [626.8] [626.8] 
After -0.002 -0.002 0.016*** 0.016*** 1971*** 1971*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [154.0] [154.0] 
Merger*After 0.104*** -0.008 -0.022** -0.007 -162.0 532.9 
  [0.013] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [419.8] [485.9]    
Seatloss*After -0.114*** 0.125*** 0.107*** 0.047*** 4880*** 1618**  
  [0.026] [0.025] [0.015] [0.018] [554.2] [793.6]    
R2 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.12 
N  814 814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Again, in Table 5 we allow for treatment effect heterogeneity. The quality 
of candidates that become available in the relatively small municipalities from 
the larger municipalities due to the reform seems to depend on distance and 
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income difference. For example, the municipalities that are far away from the 
largest municipality in a merger have fewer highly educated candidates than 
their larger neighbors (column [11]). However, again the changes in the quality 
of local candidates are not related to the heterogeneity measures (Panels B, D 
and F). Results based on additional candidate quality measures are the same 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix).  
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Table 5. Heterogeneous effects on candidate quality. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A: Incumbents, all [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After -0.010 -0.129*** -0.075** -0.078*** -0.025 
  [0.032] [0.035] [0.032] [0.025] [0.031]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.004*** 0.026 -0.092 -0.068 -0.041*** 
After [0.001] [0.038] [0.060] [0.048] [0.012]    
Panel B: Incumbents, 
local [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After 0.152*** 0.102*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.124*** 
  [0.041] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.001 0.037 -0.036 -0.025 0.000 
After [0.002] [0.033] [0.073] [0.043] [0.013]    
Panel C: University, all [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After 0.036** 0.107*** 0.092*** 0.119*** 0.046*** 
  [0.018] [0.023] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.003*** 0.001 0.035 -0.022 0.028*** 
After [0.001] [0.020] [0.032] [0.018] [0.006]    
Panel D: University, local [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
Seatloss*After 0.037 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.062**  
  [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.018] [0.028]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.0004 -0.022 -0.057 -0.014 -0.007 
After [0.001] [0.018] [0.040] [0.024] [0.012]    
Panel E: Income, all [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 
Seatloss*After 3206*** 3997*** 4006*** 5276*** 1878**  
  [1226] [663.4] [750.2] [918.5] [873.7]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 70.61 1483* 2081* -739.1 1404*** 
After [44.60] [803.2] [1108] [1130] [260.6]    
Panel F: Income, local [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 
Seatloss*After 2901*** 550.4 2187* 1635* 3019*** 
  [940.4] [854.6] [1236] [953.2] [996.0]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -54.07* 1792 -1354 -31.20 -655.5 
After [31.45] [1162] [2303] [1313] [517.7]    
N  814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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There are three important takeaways from this section. First, the boundary 
reforms dramatically change the choice set that voters’ in the merging 
municipalities face. In relatively small municipalities, the choice set in terms of 
number of overall candidates and parties increases substantially, but the number 
of local candidates decreases.  
Second, the quality of both overall and local candidates changes 
considerably in relatively small municipalities. The new candidates from their 
merger partners are of higher quality and so is the pool of local candidates when 
compared to pre-merger local candidates. These changes reflect, at least partly, 
the strategic responses from parties and candidates to the mechanical effects of 
the reform. While they are interesting as such, these responses are potential 
confounders when we analyze voters’ reactions to changes in the choice set and 
whether we can interpret the results as evidence for local preferences and 
strategic voting. In other words, the vote concentration patterns in Figure 1 may 
simply reflect changes in the candidate quality, not strategic efforts by voters to 
ensure local representation.  
Finally, it is equally important to note that the changes in the number and 
quality of local candidates are not related to any of the preference heterogeneity 
measures (Tables 3 and 5). This means that parties and candidates respond to 
the mechanical effects (Seatloss), but the responses do not depend on 
meaningful measures of voter preferences for local representation. This finding 
plays a crucial role in our subsequent analysis of vote concentration. 
5.2.	Vote	concentration	
When analyzing voter responses, we study separately the vote concentration 
within three different candidate groups. First, as in Figure 1, we use the overall 
vote distribution where the votes can cross old municipality boundaries after a 
merger. Second, we use the vote distribution to all local candidates. From these 
vote distributions we have omitted any votes that cross pre-merger municipality 
boundaries. Finally, we use a set of local re-runners. These are the subset of 
candidates that ran in both 2004 and 2008 elections, and in both election years 
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lived in the same pre-merger municipality of interest. Thus, in this case for each 
pre-merger municipality, the set of candidates in the analysis is exactly the 
same in both years. Also for this sample, we omit all the votes that cross pre-
merger municipality boundaries.  
First we aim to understand whether voters prefer local candidates by 
looking at how many votes are given overall and how many to local candidates. 
In Table 6, we report the effects of the reform on the log of total amount of 
votes for the three different candidate groups. The log-specification is 
preferable, because of the huge variation in municipal population (minimum is 
249 and maximum 564,521). First, we see that overall the total number of votes 
(roughly turnout) decreases in the relatively small municipalities, although the 
decrease is not statistically significant.24 Second, the lower turnout due to the 
mergers in the relatively small municipalities is also reflected in how many 
votes in total are given to local candidates (column [2]). This means that some 
voters do find better matches from the merger partners and vote across (old) 
municipal boundaries. However, the group of local re-runners received more 
votes despite the substantial decrease in overall turnout. These results are in line 
both with detrimental effect of larger jurisdiction on political activity and with 
voters having preferences for local representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 This result echoes the results in Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) who report survey results 
(stated preferences) showing that jurisdiction size has detrimental effects on political efficacy. 
Our analysis goes a step further and shows that also turnout is affected (revealed preferences).  
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Table 6. Effects on the log of total number of votes. 
  All candidates Local candidates Local re-runners 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Constant 7.953*** 7.953*** 7.452*** 
  [0.057] [0.057] [0.059]    
Merger 1.401*** 1.401*** 1.606*** 
  [0.159] [0.159] [0.167]    
Seatloss -2.391*** -2.391*** -3.050*** 
  [0.171] [0.171] [0.228]    
After 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.022**  
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]    
Merger*After 0.061 -0.019 -0.146*** 
  [0.048] [0.045] [0.055]    
Seatloss*After -0.140 -0.332*** 0.481*** 
  [0.127] [0.127] [0.165]    
R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 
N  814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
In Table 7, we again allow for treatment effect heterogeneity in the (log) 
total number of votes. The table shows, that the effects of the reform on the 
total number of votes are not related to any of our heterogeneity measures in 
any of the candidate groups.  
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Table 7. Heterogeneous effects on the log of number of votes. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A: All candidates [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After -0.042 -0.192** -0.155 -0.222 -0.061 
  [0.354] [0.090] [0.122] [0.213] [0.262] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.004 0.088 0.036 0.154 -0.037 
After [0.011] [0.190] [0.301] [0.230] [0.076] 
Panel B: Local candidates [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After -0.347 -0.342*** -0.356*** -0.393* -0.323 
  [0.357] [0.085] [0.125] [0.212] [0.263] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.001 0.017 0.058 0.114 -0.004 
After [0.011] [0.192] [0.322] [0.228] [0.076] 
Panel C: Local re-runners [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After 0.095 0.474*** 0.382** 0.296 0.300 
  [0.416] [0.169] [0.149] [0.249] [0.317] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.016 0.012 0.236 0.346 0.085 
After [0.014] [0.228] [0.336] [0.265] [0.092] 
N  814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Finally, we turn to vote concentration. Columns [1] and [2] of Table 8 are 
regression versions of Figure 1, where we study the effects on concentration 
within all the candidates. We also report concentration of votes within all local 
candidates and within local re-runners. The reform caused substantial vote 
concentration within all these candidate groups and the effects are statistically 
highly significant. For example, from column [1] we see that the maximum vote 
share increases by 9.2 (0.121 – 0.029) percentage points due to the reform on 
average in those municipalities that expect to have no local representatives in 
the post-merger council (Seatloss equal to one). Interestingly, the treatment 
effect is negative for those merged municipalities who do not expect to lose any 
seats (Seatloss equal to zero).25  
                                                 
25 This is consistent with strategic voting, because in relatively large municipalities a strategic 
voter would not want to waste the vote to the most popular candidate. 
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Table 8. Effects on vote distributions. 
  All candidates Local candidates Local re-runners 
  
Maximum 
vote share 
Herfindahl 
index  
Maximum 
vote share 
Herfindahl 
index  
Maximum 
vote share 
Herfindahl 
index  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.095*** 0.045*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]    
Merger -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.060*** -0.047*** 
  [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.008] [0.008]    
Seatloss 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.156*** 0.128*** 
  [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.024] [0.025]    
After 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004** 0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]    
Merger*After -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.010 -0.010*** 
  [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003]    
Seatloss*After 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.176*** 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.050*** 
  [0.023] [0.018] [0.027] [0.024] [0.016] [0.011]    
R2 0.35 0.23 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.34 
N  814 814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 9 presents the treatment effect heterogeneity results based on Eq. 
(3). We draw three insights from Table 9. First, vote concentration increases as 
the median change in the voters’ distance to municipality center increases. This 
effect is also very large: an additional 10 km in distance increases the maximum 
vote share by roughly 5 percentage points (column [1]). In other words, each 
additional 10 km roughly doubles the maximum vote share from its baseline. 
Notice also that when Distance is close to zero there is no vote concentration, 
even in municipalities with high values of Seatloss. This suggests that voters in 
these municipalities have no need to act strategically because their distance to 
local services is unlikely to increase after the merger. 
Second, concentration increases with income differences and also this 
effect is quantitatively large. At a given level of Seatloss, a one standard 
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deviation (1,085 Euros) increase in the income difference increases the 
maximum vote share by 3.5 percentage points, again a substantial increase from 
the baseline. The same patterns emerge when the Herfindahl index is used as 
the outcome.  
Finally, we find no heterogeneity in the treatment effect with respect to 
our direct policy measures (party, tax rate and per capita expenditures). The 
results are again very similar when using the outcomes calculated based on 
subsets of local candidates (Panels C through F). Together these results suggest 
that voters care about the geographic location of public services and that there 
is between municipality preference heterogeneity over services.26 Of course, 
remotely situated small municipalities are, on average, poorer than their merger 
partners, which means that distance and income measures are correlated.27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 We also estimated these models using an extensive set of control variables, including 
municipality characteristics and mean candidate characteristics (See Table A4 in the Appendix). 
Adding controls does not change our results. Furthermore, because voter turnout decreased, we 
also estimated the vote concentration regressions using the 2004 number of total votes when 
calculating candidates’ vote shares. Reassuringly, the results remain the same (not reported here 
for brevity, but available from authors). 
27 When we include both distance and income into the same regression the coefficient on 
income (Seatloss*Income*After) goes effectively to zero, but the coefficient on distance 
(Seatloss*Distance*After) diminishes only slightly. The p-value for distance in this regression 
is 0.065. This suggests that distance to services is the most important factor that voters care 
about. 
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Table 9. Heterogeneous effects on vote distributions. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A: All, Max share [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After 0.009 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.052*** 
  [0.035] [0.036] [0.014] [0.017] [0.020]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005** -0.016 0.071 0.032 0.032*** 
After [0.002] [0.029] [0.054] [0.038] [0.009]    
Panel B: All, HI [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After -0.029 0.072** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.020*   
  [0.030] [0.030] [0.007] [0.009] [0.011]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.004** -0.021 0.048 0.030 0.018*** 
After [0.002] [0.023] [0.043] [0.029] [0.006]    
Panel C:  Local, Max share [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After 0.050 0.175*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.096*** 
  [0.040] [0.041] [0.023] [0.023] [0.031]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005*** 0.001 0.084 0.049 0.037*** 
After [0.002] [0.037] [0.065] [0.049] [0.012]    
Panel D: Local, HI [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
Seatloss*After -0.003 0.119*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.057**  
  [0.038] [0.038] [0.015] [0.017] [0.023]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005** -0.006 0.075 0.052 0.027*** 
After [0.002] [0.032] [0.057] [0.042] [0.010]    
Panel E: Re-runners, Max share [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 
Seatloss*After 0.028 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.031 
  [0.025] [0.019] [0.021] [0.025] [0.032]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.002*** 0.027 0.052 0.021 0.022**  
After [0.001] [0.021] [0.037] [0.034] [0.009]    
Panel F: Re-runners, HI [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 
Seatloss*After 0.001 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.018 
  [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.022]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.002*** 0.003 0.019 0.015 0.015**  
After [0.001] [0.013] [0.027] [0.021] [0.006]    
N  814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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5.3.	Discussion	and	alternative	explanations	
How should we interpret the results in Tables 8 and 9 against the evidence 
concerning the voters’ choice set changes reported in Tables 2–5? First, we 
discuss voter preferences for local representation and then turn to strategic 
behavior. 
Local representation: From Table 2, we see that voters in relatively 
small merging municipalities face a much larger choice set in terms of overall 
number candidates and parties, but at the same time have fewer local candidates 
to choose from. In light of these numbers, if voters do not value local 
representation, we should probably observe less concentrated vote distributions 
after the mergers because voters are likely to find better matches from the larger 
number of alternatives. More concentrated vote distributions after the voters are 
presented with a larger choice set, as reported in Figure 1 and Table 8, imply 
strong preferences for local representation.  
There are two alternative explanations for these findings. First, it could be 
that due to a merger some prominent national politicians or other ‘superstars’ 
become available to all voters of the merging municipalities. However, out of 
the 120 merged municipalities, in only three cases the most popular candidate 
after the merger lived in some other (pre-merger) municipality in the merger 
and none of these municipalities were in the strong incentives group. Second, 
we could observe vote concentration simply because voters have better 
information about the quality of local candidates and continue to vote for 
familiar local candidates. However, information advantage cannot drive vote 
concentration among local candidates and especially among local re-runners 
because all of these candidates should benefit equally from the local 
information advantage. More importantly, it is reassuring also from this 
perspective that the local candidate attrition and quality changes are orthogonal 
to the preference heterogeneity measures. 
Strategic voting: Even though Seatloss directly measures strategic 
incentives to concentrate votes in order to increase local representation, whether 
33 
 
these results can be interpreted as evidence in favor of strategic voting is a 
question we need to address carefully. This is because the voters’ choice set 
changes are correlated with Seatloss (Tables 2 and 4) and it could be that the 
choice set changes and preferences for local representation alone are driving the 
results. In other words, as some voters lose their old candidate they keep on 
voting for local candidates instead of the new ones from other municipalities, 
which results in the reported vote concentration patterns even if voters were 
sincere. Alternatively, the local candidate quality, as well as voters’ preferences 
for candidate skills, may change along with Seatloss. The latter could happen, 
for example, because different political skills may be valuable in larger post-
merger municipalities than in the smaller pre-merger municipalities. If this is 
the case, the concentration patterns may simply reflect voters’ sincere demand 
for higher quality local candidates after a merger.  
However, the results in Tables 3 and 5 together with Table 9 largely rule 
out these interpretations. From Tables 3 and 5, we see that the changes in the 
number and quality of local candidates are not related to preference 
heterogeneity measures (especially the interaction term of distance and Seatloss 
after the mergers), whereas, according Table 9, the vote concentration patters 
clearly are. That is, we can rule out choice set confounders in Table 9 and 
conclude that voters respond to strategic concentration incentives when the 
rewards for local representation are high. 
A further argument in favor of strategic voting is that the votes are more 
concentrated also within the set of local re-runners. The results indicate that the 
voters, whose former preferred candidate no longer runs, vote popular local re-
runners disproportionally relative to the candidates’ popularity in the pre-
merger elections. Alternatively, concentration among local re-runners means 
that some voters abandon their former candidate, even when the candidate 
reruns, in order to vote for a candidate with a legitimate chance of election. 
Either way, this evidence is consistent with strategic voting.  
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There are three further alternative explanations for our results concerning 
strategic voting. The first alternative is that parties or candidates respond 
strategically by changing campaigning tactics, which is unobservable to us. The 
logic of this concern is the following: Candidates who have a genuine chance of 
getting elected may exert more campaigning effort than other candidates. If 
these candidates exert more effort in a disproportionate way relative to their 
popularity in the pre-merger elections and if voters are very responsive to 
campaigning, this could explain our concentration results (overall and within 
local re-runners).28 However, the finding that the concentration among local re-
runners increases with income differences and especially with distance is not 
consistent with candidates’ campaigning effort, whereas it is consistent with 
voter preferences for local representation. Candidates who care only for 
political power should not respond to preference heterogeneity measures unless 
also the benefits of holding office are correlated with these measures.29 Of 
course this is an indirect test and we cannot rule out confounding campaigning 
responses entirely. 
The second alternative example of a sincere response is that voters may 
simply reward candidates that supported a successful merger. However, 90 
percent of the 2004 councilors in the re-runners sample voted in favor of the 
mergers in the council meetings, and thus, there is not enough variation in 
councilors’ voting behavior to explain the variation in the concentration 
patterns we observe.  
Third, voters may reward politicians who bring home pork by strategic 
overspending prior to merging, which is then funded by the new merger 
partners. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) show that this is indeed the case in 
Finland and that such free-riding is strongly correlated with Seatloss. However, 
in Table A4 we report regression results where we directly control for 
                                                 
28 If campaigning is mostly related to conferring information on election probabilities, 
campaigning can be seen as a coordination device which facilitates strategic voting. 
29 Moreover, previous empirical evidence suggests that it is quite difficult to influence voter 
behavior with campaigning (Levitt 1994; Gerber et al. 2003 and Krasno and Green 2008). 
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municipal debt and spending and other characteristics and the results remain the 
same. 
In addition, as pointed out by Kawai and Watanabe (2013) it is important 
to distinguish strategic voting from misaligned voting. For some strategic 
voters, their sincere and strategic choice may coincide. Misaligned voters are 
those whose strategic choice differs from their sincere choice. Our DID 
approach can only detect misaligned voting, because we identify changes in 
voting behavior due to changes in election probabilities (Seatloss). At the same 
time, estimating the percentage of strategic voters is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
6.	Conclusions	
In this paper, we analyze the value of local political representation to voters by 
studying how voters in local municipal council elections reacted to a recent 
wave of municipality mergers in Finland. A municipal merger can be seen as an 
electoral boundary reform that expands the choice set available to voters and at 
the same time intensifies political competition. We find, using DID methods, 
that voters in merging municipalities concentrate their votes to strong local 
candidates compared to voters in municipalities that did not merge. Moreover, 
the concentration effect is clearly stronger in municipalities that were less likely 
to gain local representation in the post-merger councils based on counterfactual 
election calculations. This happened despite the fact that the voters in the 
merged municipalities had a much larger set of candidates and parties to choose 
from after a merger.  
We also find that the concentration effect is larger in municipalities where 
the benefits of local representation to voters are large. This result allows us to 
disentangle voters’ behavioral responses from the responses of other political 
actors. We interpret these results so that voters value local representation and 
that some voters vote strategically in order to guarantee it. 
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Besides providing novel evidence on both the importance of preferences 
for local representation and strategic voting, the results have implications for 
merger policy. The upside of larger municipalities is that they may internalize 
inter-jurisdictional spillovers and facilitate exploitation of scale economies, but 
the downside is that they lead to an increasing mismatch of preferences and 
public services if there are spatial differences in voter preferences. A number of 
papers have shown that this type of heterogeneity is important (e.g. Alesina et 
al. 2004; Rodden 2010; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014).  
Our results contribute to this literature by shedding further light on the 
type of preference heterogeneity among voters that is relevant for merger policy 
and by showing that voters perceive local representation to be important in 
transferring these preferences into policy outcomes. Furthermore, concerns over 
deteriorating local democracy due to mergers are important due to preferences 
for local representation, but observed vote concentration somewhat alleviates 
these concerns. An interesting future avenue for research would be to analyze 
whether local representation has an effect on the subsequent policy decisions in 
the merged municipalities. 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics for heterogeneity measures (N = 120).  
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Distance (km)a 11.47 12.40 -1.711 50.03 
Different largest partyb 0.292 0.456 0.000 1.000 
Difference in tax rate 0.285 0.283 0.000 1.479 
Difference in expenditures (€ per capita) 0.313 0.346 0.001 1.695 
Difference in taxable income (€ per capita) 1.087 1.085 0.007 5.259 
a Difference between the median distances of eligible voters to the center of the pre-merger 
municipality and the largest municipality in the merger. It equals zero for the largest 
municipality. 
b Dummy that equals 1 if a municipality had a different largest party than the largest 
municipality in a merger and zero otherwise.   
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Figure A1. Histograms of party vote shares in 2004. 
Notes: The histograms are for the three largest parties and the Swedish People’s Party, which is 
a large party in the municipalities with a Swedish speaking majority. 
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Figure A2. Vote distribution trends in an alternative control group, 1996–2008.  
Notes:  The alternative control group consists of municipalities that did not merge, but whose 
councils voted for a merger between the 2004 and 2008 elections. The merger group includes 
all mergers, regardless of Seatloss. 
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Table A2. Heterogeneous effects on additional measures of candidate quality. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A: Age, all [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After 2.489*** 2.232*** 2.567*** 1.963*** 3.163*** 
  [0.657] [0.649] [0.680] [0.532] [0.706]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.041* -1.194** -2.489** -0.826 -0.768*** 
After [0.022] [0.567] [1.164] [0.688] [0.224]    
Panel B: Age, local [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After 3.949*** 3.659*** 3.699*** 3.401*** 4.166*** 
  [0.660] [0.734] [0.748] [0.585] [0.687]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.029 -0.658 -1.029 -0.250 -0.421 
After [0.025] [0.627] [1.086] [0.810] [0.265]    
Panel C: Female, all [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After -0.006 0.003 -0.002 0.013 -0.019 
  [0.020] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.001 0.013 0.031 -0.002 0.014* 
After [0.001] [0.016] [0.034] [0.021] [0.007] 
Panel D: Female, local [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
Seatloss*After -0.031 -0.003 0.011 -0.016 -0.005 
  [0.027] [0.031] [0.029] [0.022] [0.032] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.002 0.015 -0.012 0.040 0.005 
After [0.001] [0.027] [0.041] [0.043] [0.010] 
Panel E: Mun. Employee, all [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 
Seatloss*After 0.038* 0.028* 0.031 0.024 0.038 
  [0.023] [0.015] [0.019] [0.021] [0.025] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.0001 0.022 0.023 0.032 0.001 
After [0.001] [0.017] [0.036] [0.030] [0.009] 
Panel F: Mun. Employee, local [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 
Seatloss*After 0.030 -0.019 0.009 -0.034 0.017 
  [0.028] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.022] 
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* -0.002* 0.022 -0.037 0.051 -0.011 
After [0.001] [0.022] [0.047] [0.041] [0.010] 
N  814 814 814 814 814 
Notes: The regressions use two years of data from 2004 and 2008. The cross-sectional units are 
the pre-merger municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the post-merger municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively 
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Table A3. Heterogeneous effects on vote distributions with control variables. 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income 
Panel A: All, Max share [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Seatloss*After -0.001 0.117*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.031 
  [0.029] [0.033] [0.012] [0.017] [0.024]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005** -0.023 0.113*** 0.069 0.033*** 
After [0.002] [0.029] [0.042] [0.043] [0.006]    
Panel B: All, HI [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Seatloss*After -0.042* 0.064** 0.018** 0.020** 0.009 
  [0.023] [0.028] [0.007] [0.008] [0.019]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.004** -0.030 0.070** 0.053 0.018*** 
After [0.002] [0.022] [0.034] [0.037] [0.003]    
Panel C:  Local, Max share [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Seatloss*After 0.047 0.165*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.075**  
  [0.040] [0.042] [0.017] [0.022] [0.032]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005*** -0.002 0.132*** 0.099* 0.041*** 
After [0.002] [0.036] [0.051] [0.052] [0.008]    
Panel D: Local, HI [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
Seatloss*After -0.011 0.117*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.047*   
  [0.033] [0.039] [0.011] [0.014] [0.028]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.005*** -0.015 0.101** 0.090** 0.029*** 
After [0.002] [0.032] [0.046] [0.045] [0.006]    
Panel E: Re-runners, Max share [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 
Seatloss*After -0.010 0.038 -0.001 0.032 -0.021 
  [0.030] [0.025] [0.021] [0.031] [0.033]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.003** 0.009 0.105** 0.023 0.030*** 
After [0.001] [0.026] [0.046] [0.032] [0.010]    
Panel F: Re-runners, HI [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 
Seatloss*After -0.046** 0.021 -0.013 0.011 -0.031 
  [0.022] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.025]    
Seatloss*Heterogeneity* 0.003*** -0.014 0.063 0.009 0.021*** 
After [0.001] [0.018] [0.040] [0.018] [0.007]    
N  730 730 730 730 730 
Notes: This table reproduces the results from Table 9 with control variables.  These models can 
be estimated only for the subset of mergers that took effect at the start of 2009. For earlier 
mergers we do not have data on municipality characteristics for the election year 2008 as they 
ceased to exist and municipality characteristics are not available at the pre-merger level after 
merging. The control variables include the municipality and means of candidate characteristics 
reported in Table A1. Candidate characteristics may be bad controls (i.e. alternative outcomes) 
so the results from these models should only be seen as robustness tests. Standard errors are 
clustered at the post-merger municipality level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
